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HOW THE UMPIRES REMAKE THE GAME
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth).
Julie Novkov2
The relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress
is both analytically and normatively controversial. To what extent
has the Court checked Congress by overturning or modifying
legislation through its interpretive practices? Under what
circumstances is it likely to do so, and have some courts more
aggressively policed their conceptions of constitutional
boundaries than others? Does the Court thwart the democratic
will of the people when it invalidates or modifies congressional
legislation? And if so, under what circumstances is this kind of
checking appropriate?
These concerns rest on an examination of constitutional
history. A stock narrative presents judicial activism toward
Congress as almost non-existent in the Antebellum Era,
significant in limiting the scope of Reconstruction, reaching a
crescendo prior to 1937 to thwart the early New Deal, and then
resurfacing with the Rehnquist Court. In this narrative, as the
Court has shifted to a more conservative makeup, it has at times
thwarted the democratic will of Congress, but these democratic
failures can also be laid at the door of a national legislature that is
increasingly dysfunctional and has great difficulty in crafting
successful policy interventions to resolve the major problems
facing the nation.
Running through this narrative is a normative debate about
the proper role of the Court in reviewing congressional
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
2. Professor of Political Science and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies,
University at Albany, SUNY.
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legislation. Concerns about the antidemocratic nature of judicial
review appear as a constant across history, with any invalidation
of an Act of Congress understood as potentially anti-democratic.
Dred Scott v. Sandford3 takes on the cast of an original sin, and
scholars writing from different ideological perspectives identify
their favorite stalking horses (often Lochner4 for the right and
Roe5 for the left) as its legitimate progeny. The key debate is over
what constitutes illegitimate judicial activism, and which
ideological sides of the Court are engaging in judicial activism
improperly.
A second narrative within political science identifies Justices
as political and strategic actors whose aim is to achieve their policy
preferences. The theory that “judges decide cases in light of their
sincere ideological values juxtaposed against the factual stimuli
presented by the case” seems to hold best for Supreme Court
Justices, who do not face as many potential checks on their
behavior as do lower federal court judges.6 The strategic approach
imagines judges, including Justices, as driven by their rational
preferences, but inclined to pursue those preferences through a
conscious recognition of competing interests and boundaries.7
Scholars of American constitutional development have
encouraged a more nuanced discussion of this relationship. Mark
Graber’s germinal article in 1993 challenged the narrative
concerning countermajoritarianism, asking instead whether
legislatures might at times write statutes that invite judicial
interpretation to solve the legislatures’ political problems.8 Barry
Friedman develops a historicized account of the variety of ways in
which the Court and Congress have both engaged in contestation
and collaboration over the years; he shows that the
countermajoritarian difficulty itself is a historically contingent
construction.9 George Lovell’s work shows that late nineteenthand early twentieth-century legislators did indeed “deliberately
3. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Jeffrey A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF L. & POL. 19,
25–26 (Keith E. Whittington et al., eds., 2008).
7. See Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF L. & POL. 34, 35 (Keith E. Whittington et al., eds., 2008).
8. See Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
9. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N. Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998).
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create . . . conditions that empowered judges to make important
substantive decisions on labor policy.”10
This literature has also interrogated how political regimes
line up with judicial time. Judges and Justices with life tenure may
be out of alignment with the current dominant elected coalition in
national politics. This has sometimes caused friction, but often
when the Court acts against legislation, it does so to restrict the
bargains made by previous governing coalitions, aligning policy
more directly to current legislative and public preferences.11
Congress has also strengthened or added capacity to the court
system, conscious of the federal courts’ capacity to collaborate
with extant regimes and protect their policy innovations.12
Here lies Keith Whittington’s intervention. He has collected
and reviewed all of the cases in which the Court has directly
considered the constitutionality of congressional legislation. His
review provides a dimension to these questions that previous
analyses have missed, while seconding the challenges that
analyses of constitutional development present to the stock
narratives. It articulates and defends a conception of the Court
largely as a collaborator—but an active and engaged collaborator,
which at times drives the developmental process.
Whittington’s analysis is comprehensive. Rather than
analyzing only those cases that have come to be accepted as
landmarks, he has collected the entire universe of cases that
“explicitly considered a constitutional challenge to the scope of
federal legislative authority and rendered a substantive
judgment” (p. 317). The dataset excludes cases in which the Court
did not engage in explicit constitutional deliberation when
applying or interpreting a law, nor does it include cases “in which
the Court made trivial references to Congress’s constitutional
authority to pass the law being applied or dismissed a
constitutional challenge without elaboration as fully resolved in
an earlier case” (p. 317). By including cases in which the Court
considered but did not invalidate statutes on constitutional
grounds, Whittington can better assess the Court’s overall impact
on the course of congressional legislation and its important efforts
10. GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY,
JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 45 (2003).
11. See THOMAS KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014).
12. See JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012).
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to reinforce the constitutional basis for contested laws.
Whittington’s analysis identifies three broad eras. First was
the antebellum period, when invalidations were sporadic but a
steady rate of considerations kept the Court in the conversation.
Between the Civil War and World War I, the Court engaged in
many more confrontations with Congress, striking down statutes
and provisions at a rate of almost one per year. The final period,
since World War I, has seen a higher rate of invalidations,
reaching nearly three per year. Within his eras, Whittington
confirms that many of the periods identified by other scholars as
particularly active ones for Court invalidations of statutes fulfilled
that reputation (pp. 27–28).
Whittington concludes that the Court is neither a lapdog
(pace Dahl13) nor a purely political actor (pace Segal and
Spaeth14). Rather, it sometimes supports regimes, but often
shapes the ways that these regimes legitimize their political
actions. While Whittington’s Court often acts as a regime partner,
it does so on its own terms from its distinctive institutional place.
Whittington’s Court is an independent institutional collaborator,
one that is both active and engaged. His work aligns with those
who study constitutional development through an institutional
/political development lens, but his analysis provides a deeper
confirmation of these insights.
The project’s scope is impressive. The rulings included span
the entire course of constitutional history and constitute more
than 1300 cases, and he has generously made his database
available for future scholars.15 On the whole, these cases show the
range of debates that the Court identified as setting the
boundaries of constitutional controversy; even the cases in which
the Court upheld acts of Congress illustrate the presence of a
debate and the Court’s own judgment that it had a duty to weigh
in to settle it. Scholars have largely not recognized generally how
contested acts of Congress tend to be, even in moments when the
Court is supporting congressional actions. The comprehensive

13. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
14. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
15. See Keith Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Database,
https://scholar.princeton.edu/kewhitt/publications/judical-review-congress-database (last
visited Nov. 13, 2019).
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nature of the study also facilitates critical insights about when and
how the Court was a partner versus a challenger in its relationship
with Congress.
The large number of cases reviewed necessarily focuses
attention on trends and patterns. Whittington confirms the insight
of regime analysts: the Court is less likely to review contemporary
legislation and much of its “actual exercise of the power of judicial
review involves considering statutes that have been in place for
some time” (p. 33). This finding also suggests that the Court
comports in part with the judicial modesty best expressed in
Justice Brandeis’s Ashwander rules,16 only very infrequently
opting to consider a statute before litigants are available who can
express a conflict over the concrete effects of its operation. While
looking only at the time that has passed does not indicate whether
the Court is collaborating with a current regime or has simply
waited until an issue has been fully aired in the lower federal
courts, both factors might often drive in the same direction,
contributing to his finding that more than half of the cases in
which the Court constitutionally reviewed congressional
legislation addressed statutes that were more than eight years old.
One significant question is what we might learn from the dogs
that don’t bark. A ruling that raises a constitutional question only
to resolve it in favor of the statute’s constitutionality sends a signal
of regime support if the statute is relatively recent. It may likewise
signify the continued vitality of a prior regime’s imperatives, or
may update the foundational supports for a particular legislative
or administrative system. Constitutional issues may, however, be
raised in the lower federal courts only to have the Supreme Court
decline to address them or dispose of them in so summary a
fashion as to exclude them from the cases in Whittington’s
analysis. Such disposals may send a stronger signal about
constitutionality to Congress than a case that produces a lengthy
but positive analysis alongside a vigorously argued dissent in a
divided Court.
The Court’s deliberate refusal to engage such arguments can
serve as an important signaling device. From our contemporary
vantage point, in a few key precedents after 1937 the Court laid

16. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Whittington
notes, however, that the Court often interpreted the Constitution to settle statutory issues
rather than reading statutes to avoid constitutional collisions (p. 318).
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out comprehensive justifications for its retreat from searching
investigations of the limits of state police power and federal
regulatory authority in the face of challenges based in liberty of
contract and claims of illegitimate class legislation.17 The case was
closed. From the vantage point of the lawyers arguing cases in the
years shortly afterward, however, the Court’s abandonment of
these frameworks was not immediately evident. Thus in 1942, a
Minnesota manufacturer protested the enforcement of overtime
pay and timekeeping regulations against it under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Carleton Screw Products invoked liberty of
contract to challenge the act’s validity, claiming that it constituted
an “unconstitutional usurpation of power by Congress,” that was
unsustainable under the Commerce Clause and, further, that they
had been denied equal protection.18 The Supreme Court never
bothered addressing these claims, which the Eighth Circuit simply
dismissed summarily as “without merit.”19
This example raises important questions about litigation
dynamics. How and when can the Court signal that certain kinds
of arguments simply might not be worth making any longer, and
what kinds of signals are most effective in indicating that a recent
Court decision was indeed jurispathic20—a jurisprudential dead
end that cannot be further activated or manipulated, even in
modified fashion? This question demands investigation of the
legal frameworks underlying cases, and how these frameworks are
employed in later litigation.
This concern raises a related question. What is going on when
the Court either upholds or strikes down legislation? Simply
knowing that the Court has supported or thwarted Congress may
not tell us everything that we need to know. These umpires can
remake the game when they call their balls and strikes. At times
the Court’s reasoning in opinions either trammels or redirects the
flow of congressional authority. Further, by shaping the
permissible logics that undergird congressional action, the Court
influences not only whether Congress can act, but how Congress
acts, and reinforces the avenues through which congressional
power can flow freely or may be blocked entirely.
17. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); W. Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18. Carleton Screw Prods. Co. v. Fleming, 126 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 1942).
19. Id.
20. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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Three historical examples bear this out: the Court’s response
to congressional efforts to transform the South in the post-Civil
War era, its response to New Deal legislation, and its handling of
Tenth Amendment challenges in the period between revitalizing
federalism in National League of Cities v. Usery21 in 1976 and its
termination of the experiment in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority22 in 1985. This Essay concludes by
showing that how the Court upheld or invalidated acts of
Congress mattered.
We might assume that when the Court invalidates a statute
or its application, it intends to end a debate as well, but this is not
always how invalidation works. We can observe this phenomenon
more closely by looking at a misunderstood example in
constitutional history: the common belief that in the years
following the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Court acted aggressively to rein in congressional capacity to
transform the South and destroy the remnants of slave power.
Pamela Brandwein’s analysis supports a different narrative.23
Whittington argues that the Chase and Waite Courts were
“constitutionally activist” in ways that countered what models of
judicial change might predict. An empowered Republican Party
reformed the court system, providing the opportunity for a rapid
makeover to benefit their regime. During the war, the Court
largely dodged constitutional confrontations. Afterward, though,
invalidations of congressional legislation reached “an
unprecedented rate” (p. 125). Whittington explains the Court’s
positioning as its navigation of fissures within the Republican
Party, siding with more conservative party members who had lost
their appetite for mobilizing the federal government to challenge
private discrimination (p. 144).
Brandwein argues that the famous cases of the 1870s and
1880s that have traditionally been read as the Court’s
abandonment of the project of Reconstruction were rooted in
Antebellum distinctions lost in history. The Justices, led by Justice
Bradley, attempted to mobilize distinctions between the types of
rights that the Reconstruction Amendments protected to
determine the boundaries of appropriate congressional
21. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
22. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
23. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2011).
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management and federal enforcement.24 One of the most
notorious rulings, the Court’s 1876 decision in Cruikshank,25
overturned the convictions of whites responsible for the brutal
murder of black voters in Louisiana. Whittington notes the ruling
as an instance of an invalidation of congressional authority as
applied, and this outcome is one of the primary pieces of evidence
supporting the abandonment narrative (pp. 134–135).
Brandwein, however, reads the case differently. Situating it
in the uncertainty preceding the election of 1876, she argues that
Chief Justice Waite crafted the opinion carefully to accommodate
the possibility of either a Democratic or a Republican victory.
While the Democratic supporters of Cruikshank had pressed for
a complete invalidation of the federal enforcement mechanism,
Waite invalidated it only as applied, relying on but not reiterating
Bradley’s earlier full analysis to criticize the federal prosecutors’
failure to allege that Cruikshank’s actions were based on racial
motivations.26 This narrower ruling provided crucial information
to federal prosecutors and directed their use of enforcement
mechanisms. Brandwein traces this evolutionary process through
the infamous Civil Rights Cases of 1883.27 Whittington’s database
acknowledges that the Civil Rights Cases involved the invalidation
of legislation as applied, but Brandwein’s historically grounded
reading reveals the significance of the ruling. The majority’s
famous limitation of congressional power to address only state
action incorporated the idea that the states had the responsibility
to enforce their laws equally, protecting the rights and privileges
of all state citizens. Their failure to do so, in Brandwein’s
convincing rereading, constituted state neglect and justified
federal intervention that could reach private wrongs.28 The true
villains who strangled the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of
regulatory power to Congress were the members of the Fuller
Court, not the Waite Court,29 a recognition rendered possible only
by understanding the differences in the ways that each Court
grappled with these laws.
The famous struggle over New Deal legislation provides a

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 97–99.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
See BRANDWEIN, supra note 23, at 118–19.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See BRANDWEIN, supra note 23, at 165–68.
See id. at 184–205.
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second example. Whittington does not present the simplistic
narrative that a conservative Court thwarted the New Deal at
every turn until threatened by the Roosevelt Administration with
the court-packing plan, causing the Court to relent. He does,
however, frame the Court as “balky,” explaining the problem as a
core cohort of four conservatives who could sometimes bring the
Court’s two centrists (Charles Evan Hughes and Owen Roberts)
into play on their side (pp. 193–194). Whittington details the
Court’s curbing of Congress, culminating in the invalidation of
several major planks of the New Deal by spring 1936, and setting
the stage for a post-electoral confrontation between a determined
and empowered President and a recalcitrant Court (pp. 195–206).
He then describes the Court’s retreat after the announcement of
the Court-packing plan, which itself collapsed as the Court drew
back. As he notes, the Court, whose membership had also
changed due to two critical retirements, invalidated no provisions
of federal statutes in 1937, 1938, or from 1940–42 (pp. 208–209).
A deeper consideration of the terms on which the Court
thwarted regulation complicates this narrative. Scholars of
constitutional development, including Howard Gillman and
myself, have argued that the period prior to the 1937
transformation featured developmental struggles and shifts as the
Court wrestled with jurisprudential frameworks that proved
increasingly difficult to apply to the changing terms and
conditions of American labor.30 Barry Cushman, writing to
debunk the conventional political reading of the 1937 volte face,
argues that the Court’s series of rulings in the late 1920s and early
1930s established a trajectory that led to the collapse of a
previously integrated body of doctrine in the 1934 case of Nebbia
v. New York,31 which addressed a state rather than a federal
statute.32 Further, he observes, the early New Deal statutes were
hastily drafted by “politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists who had
paid little attention to thorny questions of constitutionality.”33
The drafters of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which fell
30. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); JULIE NOVKOV,
CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW AND LABOR IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS (2001).
31. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 41–43 (1998).
33. Id. at 162.
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victim to the Court in Schechter Poultry Company v. United
States34 in 1935, gave no serious consideration to constitutionality,
believing that its limited timeframe would allow it to achieve its
objectives before reaching the Court.35 The Guffey Coal Act,
invalidated in Carter v. Carter Coal,36 was so sloppily drafted that
the House Ways and Means Committee raised questions about its
constitutionality and the overwhelmingly Democratic Congress
passed it narrowly.37
As the Court was preparing its devastating blow to the New
Deal legislative agenda, Congress was already working on next
steps. The most important of these was the Wagner Act, which
sought to establish a new nationally managed system of regulating
the relationship between capital and labor. Members of Congress
had learned from the Court’s interventions to take more care, and
the Wagner Act’s drafters were lawyers rather than politicians
and lobbyists.38 Still, when the Court released its ruling in
Schechter, Senator Wagner recommitted his bill to the House
Labor Committee for changes to shore up its claim to
constitutionality.39 NLRB lawyers, aware that the legislation
would face constitutional challenge, proactively identified strong
test cases.40 The Court, which had ruled against the government
by a vote of 9–0 in Schechter and 5–4 in Carter v. Carter Coal, ruled
5–4 in favor of the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel in 1937.41
While Cushman’s analysis comports with Whittington’s
understanding of the Court as an empowered institutional actor,
it complicates the narrative. Unlike the Waite Court, which
signaled to Congress and the executive path through its
invalidations that the political branches had to use more care and
precision in exercising power, the Hughes Court issued sharp
rebukes to Congress. These rebukes, however, were
jurisprudential. While the Court did ultimately shift its
understanding of constitutional standards, it pushed Congress to
conform to a more cautious exercise of national regulatory
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 37.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 161.
See id. at 162.
See id. at 163.
See id. at 170–71.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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authority, thereby laying the groundwork for more successful
collaboration in the late 1930s and 1940s around the next wave of
congressional reforms.
A third example illustrates that cases that uphold legislation
may also have significance that goes beyond their positive
outcomes. A closer reading of the cases may reveal important
jurisprudential dynamics within the Court. Standards may shift
subtly even when the rulings themselves are upholding legislation.
The tangled path that led from National League of Cities to San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority illustrates this
phenomenon. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Cities
in 1976 overruled a 1968 case, Maryland v. Wirtz,42 which had
validated the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to public
employees and established a new standard for understanding the
proper extent of Congress’s authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. The narrow majority in Cities that invalidated
this provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act certainly appeared
to represent the destabilizing of a regime; President Nixon’s
appointees, led by Chief Justice Burger, sought to revitalize
federalism and re-establish the Tenth Amendment as a critical
counterweight to Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause.
Whittington’s description of this history acknowledges Wirtz
as the Court’s stalking horse in Cities, which he characterizes as a
“rare victory” for Justice Rehnquist on the Burger Court (pp.
253–254). The victory was short-lived, however; Whittington
describes the collapse of the Nixon-appointee-led majority nine
years later as a result of Justice Blackmun’s having “soured on
National League of Cities,” causing him to switch sides in Garcia,
which overruled Cities (p. 254). Cities’ primary significance in this
analysis was simply as a standalone precursor to the Rehnquist
Court’s federalist revival in the 1990s (p. 259).
David Louk’s review of the Justices’ papers during this era
illustrates the negotiations that took place behind the scenes,
tracking Justice Blackmun’s shift in Garcia and other Justices’
voting shifts after conference votes.43 Concerns about the Tenth
Amendment pre-dated Cities. In Wirtz, decided in 1968, Justice

42. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
43. See David Scott Louk, Repairing the Irreparable: Revisiting the Federalism
Decisions of the Burger Court, 125 YALE L.J. 682, 688 (2016).
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Douglas’s dissent (which Justice Stewart joined) raised the issue,
and in the 1975 case, Fry v. United States44 (which Whittington
recognizes as a victory for Congress’s amendment of the 1950
Defense Production Act), a struggle occurred behind the scenes.
While Justice Marshall’s majority opinion for seven of the nine
Justices was brief, his original draft embraced a much broader
validation of Congress’s exercise of commerce power to impose
emergency wage controls. To retain his majority with the support
of three of the four new Nixon appointees, Justice Marshall scaled
back his own rendering of congressional power drastically.45 This
set the stage for the conservative victory in Cities, in which Justice
Rehnquist, who had been the sole dissenter in Fry, was able to
build a majority around revitalizing the Tenth Amendment.46
Cities itself restricted congressional authority, but the Court
did not continue to shore up the beachhead it had established. As
Louk observes and Whittington’s database confirms, “the Court
never once relied on Cities to overturn a federal law . . . [f]ar from
disagreeing on how to apply Cities, the Court’s decisions during
this period appear to be a concerted exercise in avoiding its
application.”47 In the first post-Cities confrontations between
congressional authority and federalism, the Court upheld
Congress’s authority to regulate coal mining and sustained the
Railway Labor Act, narrowing the potential range of Tenth
Amendment claims. These rulings, however, revealed fractures
within the pro-federalism conservative coalition between those
who wanted to limit the federal government and those who
favored private enterprise.48
In 1982 and 1983, the Justices struggled with the concrete
implications, despite the definitive tone of the opinions and
dissents. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor replaced Justice Stewart
and established herself as a defender of federalism.49 Justice
O’Connor’s enthusiasm for expanding federalism nearly drew
enough support to cut back on the authority of the Federal Energy

44. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
45. See Louk, supra note 43, at 691–92.
46. See id. at 694.
47. See id. at 705.
48. See id. at 705–08 (discussing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981) and United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678
(1982)).
49. See id. at 708–13.
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Regulatory Commission on federalism grounds.50 The struggle
continued when the Court considered the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in 1983; the 1967 statute survived the challenge,
in part because Justice Brennan incorporated the Cities balancing
test, finding that the statute passed muster. Justice Stevens’
concurrence, retreating to a framework of deference to Congress,
drew strong objections from Justice Powell, joined by Justice
O’Connor.51
The critical reversal in Garcia almost didn’t happen. Justice
Blackmun, who was to write the opinion for a five-person
majority striking down the FSLA’s application on Tenth
Amendment grounds, asked his clerk, Scott McIntosh, to develop
a clear standard for identifying traditional government functions.
McIntosh’s considerations led him to suggest that Justice
Blackmun abandon this enterprise and join the four Justices
seeking to overturn Cities. Justice Blackmun ultimately concluded
that he could not create a workable, principled test that would
clear up confusion in the lower federal courts. His initial draft of
an opinion upholding the statute tried to sidestep Cities, but he
was ultimately convinced to abandon Cities.52
The deep story of the trajectory from Cities to Garcia reveals
dynamics within the Court that reflect the changing personnel on
the Court and the Court’s efforts to provide clear guidance to
lower federal courts in interpreting their rulings. The discussions
that didn’t make it into the opinions further reflect the Justices’
concerns about policy and concrete consequences. In isolation,
Congress would be expected to attend to the signals the Court
sent by upholding several extensions of its power post-National
League of Cities, but, as Louk notes, Congress responded to the
controversy by amending the FLSA to make it more flexible and
accommodating of state interests—after the reversal in Garcia.53
We can only understand these dynamics and how they laid the
groundwork for federalism’s revival in the 1990s by looking more
carefully at the signals the Court was sending even while it was
upholding legislation.
These examples highlight a peculiarity of reported appellate
50. See id. at 708–11 (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)).
51. See id. at 708–15 (discussing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)).
52. See id. at 722–23.
53. See id. at 724.
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opinions. Appellate courts generally do not write lengthy
opinions to explain settled law or pronounce uncontroversial
consensus viewpoints. With a Supreme Court that has almost
complete control over its docket, this phenomenon is even more
pronounced. The outcomes in cases are important, but the Court’s
choice to take a case, even if it ultimately upholds a questioned
statute, signals the Justices’ view that the controversy may serve
as a platform for broader institutional work. Tracking how the
Court does this work and the signals its rulings send to lawmakers,
policymakers, mobilized groups, other courts, and the public may
be as valuable as tracking the outcomes that these cases produce.
Finally, Whittington’s analysis reflects a Court that
understands itself as a distinctive institution, but one that
nonetheless conducts political work. His comprehensive review
replaces the picture of an insulated, powerful, and potentially
dangerous countermajoritarian institution with a more nuanced
picture of an institution that works with political majorities. Its
rulings, whether in favor of or against the will of Congress,
inevitably please some and infuriate others. Whittington argues
that the political realities of the Court’s institutional position and
role necessarily temper its capacity to serve as an idealized
defender of constitutional values.
The current high degree of partisanship and the increased
politicization of judicial nominations, however, raise concerns.
While the Court has never been “a constitutional guardian
standing outside of democratic politics,” Whittington suggests
that it generally operates as a legitimate part of a legitimate
democratic system, exercising its particular form of authority to
intervene in and resolve political problems through legal means
(p. 314). In 2016, for the first time in recent memory, the Supreme
Court’s membership was a campaign issue. More than one quarter
of Trump voters reported that the Supreme Court was the most
important factor in their voting, and the composition of the
Supreme Court was highly salient for Republican voters.54 While
Americans have historically trusted in the Court as an institution,
the bitterness of partisan struggle over the Court and its
membership will likely affect how Americans understand it and
54. Philip Bump, A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court
Picks—And it Paid Off, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/politics/wp/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supremecourt-picks-and-it-paid-off/.
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its role. Its capacity to continue to collaborate actively with a
Congress that itself is increasingly struggling with partisan conflict
may diminish, as may Americans’ trust in it as the final sentinel
for the rule of law. Depending on its actions, concerns about its
capacity to continue in this role may well be warranted.

35.1 NOVKOV

46

6/19/2020 11:53 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 35:31

